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points of the circle. The product at firm i’s locations represent the basic
product of firm i, its basic variety, but the latter can be redesigned by the
firm in order to match the specific consumers’ requirements bearing a unit
constatnt customization cost ti, so that the total customization cost is as-
sumed to be linear in distance. In what follows, we shall call variety the
basic product offered by the firm, and version the tailored product offered at
each location. The parameter ti synthesizes the technological properties of
the customization activity or equivalently, according to Norman (2003) and
Thisse and Vives (1988), the variable cost of redesigning the base product.
The higher the technological parameter ti, the higher are the customization
costs incurred by the firm in the market.
We shall assume that each firm has access to a set of different customiza-
tion technologies. This set is the same for all firms, which also share the same
information technology. The customization technology adopted by a firm is
always observable by its competitor. The competing firms are assumed to be
able to offer individually tailored goods such that all the varieties of a basic
product are offered; moreover they are assumed to be able to discriminate
perfectly among consumers, by setting a price schedule p (x) for each variety
depending on consumers’ location x, where x is the distance of a consumer
from the generic firm i. This price charged to the consumers includes the
cost associated with product customization, so that the mill price at each
location is the price corrected for the customization cost - the transportation
cost of adapting the firm’s base product to consumers’ needs.
In order to focus on the role of transportation costs, we assume that
the basic variety is produced at zero variable costs. However, firms bear a
set-up cost F to enter the market. This cost may be either constant and
independent of the customization cost, or decreasing in the latter. In the
first case the choice of a more efficient customization technology is costless
for the firm; in the second efficiency in customization imposes higher set-up
costs.
3 Pricing customization
It is within the above framework that the following three-stage game is
analysed: firms are assumed to decide first their entry into the market, and
then to engage a customization cost competition and a price competition.
At each stage of the game firms’ choices are simultaneous. The game is
solved by backward induction. We solve first the price stage of the game,
then we deal with the optimal choice of the customization cost. The optimal
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number of firms is determined, in the third stage, by a standard zero profit
condition. To start with, we consider a situation in which the set-up costs
are exogenous and independent of the customization technology.
3.1 The case with fixed set-up costs
3.1.1 The price stage
At the price stage we assume that n firms are on the circle, therefore a firm
is 1n far from its neighbours. The customization cost which firm i bears
to deliver the product with attributes x is equal to tix, while the same
variety is delivered by the adjacent firms at a cost equal to ti−1
¡
1
n − x
¢
.
The equilibrium in prices is an optimal price schedule for each firm, that
holds for all possible values of the customization parameter.
Following a Bertrand argument, since consumers buy from the firm
charging the lowest delivery price, at each point x price competition among
firms results in a delivered price that cannot be higher than the transporta-
tion cost to buy the product of the closest rival firm. As demonstrated by
Lederer and Hurter (1986) in their influential work, the 1n consumers between
two firms on the circle will be charged by firm i with a price infinitesimally
lower than pi (x) = ti−1
¡
1
n − x
¢
if tix < ti−1
¡
1
n − x
¢
, and pi (x) = tix if
tix > ti−1
¡
1
n − x
¢
. Formally, p∗i (x) = max
©
tix, ti−1
¡
1
n − x
¢ª
.
Figure 1 shows the optimal price schedule of firm i under the assumption
that the neighbouring firms have the same customization cost.
It is easy to check that the distance between firm i and the indifferent
consumer between firm i and its (identical neighbours) is ti−1n(ti+ti−1) . Notice
that, differently from the traditional Hotelling model, the highest prices are
actually paid to firm i by those among its customers who are located at a
lower distance, while the indifferent consumer pays the lowest price.
Notice also that in the presence of symmetric customization costs, the
market share of each firm at equilibrium will be obviously equal to 1n and
profits accruing to each firm are:
πi = 2
Z 1
2n
0
µ
t
n
− 2tx
¶
dx− F = t
2n2
− F
clearly increasing in t.
Given this positive relationship between t and the level of profits, we
now investigate the technological stage of the game in which firms optimally
choose their customization costs.
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Figure 1: The optimal price schedule
3.1.2 The technological game and the cost paradox
Assume now that firms may choose the customization costs, by adopting
a cost-reducing technology configuration. The technology switching is as-
sumed to be costless. More precisely we assume that each firm may choose
any t in the admissible range [tmin, tmax] . The existence of a lower bound may
be seen as a technological constraint. The existence of an upper bound must
be imposed in order to ensure that market is fully covered for reasonable
values of the consumers’ reservation utility.
The simultaneous choice of the customization cost may therefore be seen
as a sort of technological competition among firms. Consider the optimal
behaviour of firm i, given the behaviour of its adjacent rivals, firm i− 1 and
firm i + 1. If the latter behave identically, i.e. ti+1 = ti−1, profits of firm i
may be written as:
πi = 2
Z ti−1
n(ti+ti−1)
0
µ
ti−1
µ
1
n
− x
¶
− tix
¶
dx− F (1)
Inspection of the profit function (1) shows that for all possible values
of ti−1, profits of firm i are monotonically decreasing in ti. The intuition
behind this result is the following: the firm’s profits at each served location
are the difference between the rival’s customization cost at that location and
its own customization cost: a cost reduction is profitable for a firm because
it increases the mill price without affecting prices. Moreover, by reducing ti
firm i increases its market share. As a result, choosing the lowest possible
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t is a dominant strategy for each firm. Therefore, imposing the symmetry
condition, the Nash equilibrium in customization costs is ti = ti−1 = tmin.
Proposition 1 When technology switching is costless, firms behaving non
cooperatively choose the minimum level of the customizaton cost technologi-
cally available, t = tmin.
Notwithstanding the fact that the choice of a higher level of the tech-
nological parameter would soften price competition in the last stage of the
game, firms choose to lower them. Notice that this is consistent with the
cost paradox first discussed by Nelson (1957). 6 When firms may cost-
lessly choose the customization cost, the production technology game is a
prisoner’s dilemma. The equilibrium profits are:
πi = 2
Z 1
2n
0
µ
tmin
n
− 2tminx
¶
dx− F
Given the positive relation between profits and the customization cost, firms
would clearly benefit from a cooperative and simultaneous increase of t.
Indeed, the non-cooperative and the cooperative solution are the two corner
solutions, tmin in the former case, tmax in the latter.
3.1.3 The entry stage
The equilibrium number of firms is determined by the technological para-
meter tmin. The zero profit condition entails7:
n∗ =
r
1
2
tmin
F
The equilibrium number of firms is increasing in tmin and (obviously) de-
creasing in F . At equilibrium customers of firm i face the following price
schedule:
p∗i (x) = tmin
Ã √
2F√
tmin
− x
!
6The cost paradox has been examined in the literature under different types of com-
petition. For an interesting analysis of the cooperative attitude aimed at limiting price
competition, see Kline (2000) where the effects of a Research Joint Ventures are consid-
ered.
7This result is consistent with that obtained by Bhaskar and To (2000).
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which is increasing in tmin for all x served by i at equilibrium. Notice
finally that the lower the minimum customization cost, the lower the number
of firms and the lower the price paid for the customized product by each
customer.
Therefore, an interesting feature which emerges in this set-up is that a
concentrated market structure is consistent with low prices: both may be
a consequence of a technological competition which translates into lower
prices and reduces profits. In this sense, the model is consistent with a
widely observed feature of digital markets, where products are customizable
at very low costs, a few number of basic varieties are produced (the number
of firms is low), each of them offered in many different versions (the market
share of each firm is wide) at low prices. On the contrary, in markets where
the customization technology is more costly we should expect that a great
number of varieties be actually offered, each of them in a few versions, at
high prices.
The result that the availability of efficient customization technologies and
the technological competition lead to a more concentrated market structure,
with a reduction of the number of basic varieties sold at low prices in many
different versions, has been derived here under the simplified assumption
that efficiency in versioning is indeed costless. Under this assumption the
technological competition has a corner solution. In the next section we verify
the robustness of this result by reformulating the game in a situation in which
the adoption of low cost customization technologies imposes significant costs
to the firms.
3.2 The case with endogenous set-up costs
Let us assume now that the choice of the customization technology is costly
for the firm. The idea we want to capture is that the possibility of cus-
tomizing the basic product at low cost requires higher investments, which
can be assimilated to higher fixed costs expenditure that reduce marginal
customization costs (Schwartz, 1989). In order to be able to offer different
versions of the basic product at low cost, firms must afford heavier sut-up
costs. With this modification, the analysis of customization gets signifi-
cantly close to that of flexibility in production. As Norman (2003) argues:
’the adoption of flexible manufacturing imposes penalties with respect to the
additional set-up costs that are necessary to establish such flexible systems’
(p.420). Flexibility is in this case defined as the ability of a production tech-
nology to transfer the input factors from the fixed to the variable category
(Stigler, 1939 and Roller and Tombak, 1990).
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Figure 2: The shape of the set-up cost function
Therefore, in this section we modify the above framework by assuming
that the set-up costs faced by any firm i depend on the chosen level of the
customization cost. In other words the set-up costs are no more exogenous,
but determined by the optimal choice of the customization parameter. A
useful specification of the set-up cost function is the following:
Si (F, b, ti) = F − te−bti (2)
defined for ti ∈
£
tmin,
1
b
¤
, and F >
e−1
b
. This function is decreasing in ti in
the given interval, so that set-up cost savings occur as ti grows. The upper
bound on ti is set for analytical convenience, but indeed it will turn out to
be not binding. It is interesting to notice the role of the parameter b: as
it increases, the set-up cost function becomes flatter, so that higher values
of b imply a lower sensitivity of set-up costs with respect to changes in the
customization technology. Figure 2 shows the different shape taken by the
Si function for different values of b.
The solution of the price stage of the game is clearly not affected by the
endogeneization of set-up costs, which rather affects the technological stage.
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3.2.1 The technological game revisited
Given the above formulation of the set-up costs, the profits of firm i can be
rewritten as
πi (ti, ti−1, b, n) = 2
Z ti−1
n (ti + ti−1)
0
µ
ti−1
µ
1
n
− x
¶
− tix
¶
dx− F + tie−bti
(3)
The first order conditions for firm i evaluated under symmetry entail the
following solution:
t∗i = −
Φ
¡
1
4n2 e
¢
− 1
b
(4)
where Φ (z) obeys Φ (z) eΦ(z) = z and is the so called LambertW function.8
As examples of this solution, one may check that for b = 1 and n = 2
the optimal value is ti ' 0.85329; for b = 0.8 and n = 2, ti ' 1.0666. It
is possible to verify that ti < 1b for all values of b and n, so that the upper
bound imposed to ti is not binding. Moreover, ti is clearly decreasing in b:
for a given number of firms, as b increases, making the set-up cost function
flatter, firms switch to more efficient customization technologies. This result
is indeed intuitive: the lower is the marginal increase in set-up costs required
by a marginal decrease in ti, the higher is the incentive of firms to adopt the
technologies allowing a cheaper customization.
3.2.2 The entry stage
By substituting (4) into (3), we obtain the maximum profit at the second
stage of the game as a function of b and n:
π∗i (b, n) = −
1
2
Φ
¡
1
4n2 e
¢
− 1
bn2
− F +
−
Φ
¡
1
4n2 e
¢
− 1
b
exp
µ
Φ
µ
1
4n2
e
¶
− 1
¶
In order to analyse the third stage of the game which determines the
equilibrium number of firms, it is useful to rewrite the zero profit condition
in the following way:
h (b, n) = F
8The SOC for a maximum are satisfied at these value of ti.
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where
h (b, n) = −1
2
Φ
¡
1
4n2 e
¢
− 1
bn2
+
−
Φ
¡
1
4n2 e
¢
− 1
b
exp
µ
Φ
µ
1
4n2
e
¶
− 1
¶
The analytical solution of the above zero profit condition is rather cum-
bersome. It is possible to check, however, that this solution exists for eco-
nomically meaningful values of n and to analyse its qualitative properties.
Notice first that for n = 1, h (b, n) = 0.601 09b ; moreover, limn→∞ h (b, n) =
1
be
−1 and ∂∂nh (b, n) < 0 for n ≥ 1. Therefore, for all values of F ∈¡
0.601 09
b ,
1
be
−1¢, there exists a unique solution for n, with 1 < n <∞.
The equilibrium number of firms is decreasing in b. Indeed, implicit
differentiation of the zero profit condition gives
dn
db
= −
∂h
∂b
∂h
∂n
which is negative, since ∂h∂b < 0 for all n > 1.
The economic implications of the above analytical findings are easily
stated. As discussed above, parameter b may be seen as an inverse index of
the cost incurred by firms when they try to gain more efficiency in their cus-
tomization technology. As b increases, firms are induced to choose optimally
a more efficient customization technology - provided it is actually available
(t∗i > tmin) - notwithstanding the fact that this makes price competition
tougher. Profits are reduced and a lower number of firms enters the market.
This reduction in the number of firms induces a further reduction in prices,
given the properties of price competition in this discriminatory price setting.
This confirms the sharp result obtained in the fixed cost case. There,
the number of basic varieties and the price of the various versions of these
basic varieties was related to the availability of cheap customization tech-
nologies (the level of tmin). Here, they depend on the marginal cost of gains
in customization efficiency. However, the analysis of the endogenous set-up
costs case may well explain some properties of the markets of the so-called
information goods. These goods are easily customizable, in the sense that
firms may cheaply move towards customized production. The increasing
customization of these products has been accompanied by a progressive re-
duction of the number of basic varieties offered and a decrease in prices (as
an example, one may quote many software applications).
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3.2.3 An explanation of mass-customization
The growing adoption of the competitive strategy of personalization has led
to the phenomenon known as mass customization. In Vulkan’s (2003) words:
’Mass customization occurs where firms can offer at the same constant marginal
costs without having to incur additional fixed costs on every differentiated brand
they offer’ (p.48)
Indeed, mass customization is a concept born in the late 1980’s and is
now considered a new frontier in business competition.9 In the last years, the
ability of firms to offer high volumes of designed products at reasonably low
costs (da Silveira et al, 2001) has induced a change in production patterns
from the so-called mass standardization to mass customization.
The results obtained in the current work may explain mass customiza-
tion as the outcome of optimal technological and pricing strategies of firms
operating in an imperfectly competitive setting. The technological feasibility
of tailoring goods is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for widespread
customization. In a monopoly setting, highly personalized products always
lead to higher prices and profits (due to the additional surplus extraction
allowed by price discrimination); on the contrary, in a imperfectly compet-
itive environment this positive effect on profits may be outweighted when
customization increases the intensity of price competition. The equilibrium
outcome is a reduction of prices. The paper suggests that it’s competition
in customization costs that leads firms to offer tailored goods at a low cost.
This is a relatively recent phenomenon. While customized products have
always been attractive to consumers, their high prices made them mostly
unaffordable in the past. Customization and low prices were at that time
considered as conflicting goals. The simultaneous existence of advanced
technologies for customization and competition in customization are now
letting firms to offer custom design and individualized services on a large
scale and at low prices, allowing more personalization at the lower mass
production prices: integrating efficiency with customization results in mass
customization. The two features of customization and mass production are
combined together.
9One might quote Anderson and Narus (1995): ’Virtually all managers are keenly aware
that the key to winning in market after market today is excelling in tailoring one’s offerings
to the specific needs of each customer while still maintaining low costs and prices.’
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3.2.4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have discussed the optimal pricing strategies of firms of-
fering customized products in an imperfect competitive spatial environment
and the optimal structure of these markets. It must be stressed that the pa-
per does not discuss neither the conditions under which firms can profitably
increase their ability to customize, nor the issue of the optimal degree of
customization. Rather, the model embodies the idea that each consumer al-
ways achieves the desidered good; though bearing a cost, firms can produce
all desired versions of a basic commodity, so that that we can refer to the
basic structure of the model as one of ’perfect customization’. Therefore,
the emphasis of the paper has been given to the analysis of the conditions
ensuring that perfect customization can be supported at low prices.
We can identify two main directions of our analysis: we have explored
the effects of competition in the customization technology and examined
the equilibrium market structure under the two alternative hyptheses of
exogenous and endogenous set-up costs. Indeed, two types of cost have
been modeled: the cost of producing a basic variety of a good and the cost
of customizing it in order to obtain different versions, with the plausible
assumption that production costs are fixed, while customization costs are
variable, depending on the extent of customization and the quantity pro-
duced.10 The exogenous set-up cost version of the model is one in which the
two costs are independent; in the second the size of fixed costs is inversely
related to the unit customization cost.
The first result of our analysis is that, under the assumption of a cost-
less technology choice, competition in customization induces firms handling
multiple versions to adopt the most efficient personalization technology. In
particular, it has been demonstrated that when firms may choose non co-
operatively the customization parameter, the existence of a perfect spillover
- due to the correspondence between the price set at equilibrium and the
technological parameter chosen by the closest rivals - leads to an equilibrium
outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type: prices and profits are reduced to
the minimum levels consistent with technology and the nature of discrim-
inatory price competition. The optimal number of varieties and market
concentration is determined by two technological factors: the size of the ex-
ogenous set-up costs (as usual) and the cost parameter of the most efficient
customization technology. In the long run equilibrium, the maximum effi-
10 In the information economy, production costs are often considered to be independent
of scale. As stated in Shapiro and Varian (1999) and in Choi et al. (1997), information
or digital products involve high fixed cost but low, often zero, marginal costs.
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ciency in customization turns out to be associated to a mostly concentrated
market structure, which is equivalent to the existence of a few basic varieties
offered, each of them in many versions.
These extreme results are quantitatively smoothed, but qualitatively
confirmed, in an endogenous set-up cost framework. If set-up costs increase
when customization costs are lowered, market concentration turns out to
depend on the marginal loss, in terms of set-up costs, of an increase of ef-
ficiency in customization. When the set-up costs increase slowly following
a reduction in customization costs, more efficiency in customization will be
chosen at equilibrium and this will lead to lower prices. In contrast with
the existing literature based on Hotelling models, a more concentrated mar-
ket is associated to lower prices for customized products. In other words
customization at low prices becomes feasible as the investment in imple-
menting personalization systems is relatively low. In contrast, as long as
the accessible technology allows to reduce the customization costs by en-
hancing significantly the set-up costs, prices for customized goods will be
higher and a more fragmented market will arise at equilibrium. Even in this
richer framework, the tendency towards customization at low prices stems
from two basic elements: the technological possibility of customizing at low
cost and the implementation of these efficient technologies due to a sort of
technological competition between firms, which is translated into a price
competition.
Finally the paper can offer insights on the role of customization tech-
nology competition in explaining the mass-customization phenomenon. To
the best of our knowledge, this issue, widely discussed in the management
literature, has been mostly neglected in the theoretical economic analysis.
In this sense the paper can represent a step towards the development of a
research agenda focused to an economic analysis of customization strategies.
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